But such measures also have practical limits. restrictive measures can help to reduce the risks of actual or threatened Chinese technological sabotage. Risks and Limitations of Defensive Measures Finally, a crisis is no time to test the consequences of critical U.S. And all governments, including the United States, are willing to exploit domestic companies for national security purposes under various circumstances. On the other hand, the long-term risk of such a crisis seems to be trending upward as bilateral relations deteriorate. critical infrastructure systems are so complicated and decentralized. And the ultimate impact of any Chinese sabotage is uncertain, in part because U.S. China’s calculus for when and how to exploit its companies’ access to adversary systems is unknown Beijing’s concern for Chinese firms’ commercial reputations may create a state of deterrence. On the one hand, they are premised on a hypothetical, high-stakes crisis that may never come to pass. The danger posed by these scenarios is difficult to assess. But in a major crisis, Beijing might discount or accept this risk, seeing digital subversion as less dangerous and provocative than more overt forms of disruption. 3 A Chinese version of this gambit could cause significant blowback-harming the Chinese economy and turning Chinese tech companies into international pariahs, among other consequences. Britain briefly tried (and soon abandoned) a countervalue strategy at the outset of World War I, seeking to exploit its centrality in international communications and financial networks to isolate the German economy and force Berlin to quickly sue for peace. power grid, financial sector, healthcare systems, emergency services, telecommunications, or transportation networks. This might involve disruptions of the U.S. civilians, hoping to demoralize them and thereby dissuade American political leaders from confronting China forcefully. Second, Beijing could carry out a countervalue operation that harms U.S. military or dissuade American leaders from confronting China forcefully. In extreme circumstances, Beijing would consider digital sabotage to paralyze the U.S. military relies on-such as core telecommunications systems, private logistics companies, off-base electric power sources, undersea cables, commercial satellites, and cloud services. 2 In a modern digital version of such an attack, China could try to subvert unclassified and/or commercially operated infrastructure that the U.S. The scenario has parallels with Japan’s 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which sought to buy time for Tokyo to act freely in the Pacific. military assets from promptly reinforcing or resupplying American or allied forces abroad. For example, Beijing might want to stop key U.S. military and prevent American units from responding to a bilateral crisis. There are two broad scenarios.įirst, China could attempt a counterforce operation to paralyze the U.S. But in extreme circumstances, like the cusp of war, China would have strong reason to consider all its options. During peacetime, China’s interest in stable commercial and diplomatic relations generally outweighs any benefits of digital sabotage or saber-rattling. Such access could facilitate actual attacks, as well as threats (either explicit or implicit), against U.S. 1 Beijing has the legal and political tools to compel private Chinese companies to offer up any privileged access they may have to software or hardware systems used in the United States. systems during a bilateral crisis and that technological interdependence heightens this risk. The Biden and Trump administrations both have warned that China could sabotage critical U.S. Table of Contents Risks of Interdependence
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |